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A FRAME-SEMANTIC APPROACH TO ANALYZING CONCEPTS AS COMPLEX SEMANTIC UNITS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

1. Introduction

While analyzing a series of concepts that shape the discourse of the recent Egyptian revolution, we have been long aware of a growing load of methodological concerns, discussion of which we have intentionally postponed until enough material is accumulated. Now it seems to be the right time to approach some of these issues and try to formulate preliminary solutions. We will illustrate our observations here by examples taken from the analysis of the concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION), which we described in greater detail in some of our preceding publications. Our overall approach to the analysis of the political discourse concepts is based on frame-semantic analysis[1]. Each concept may be presented as a frame structure, which includes a set of elements and relations among them, which may presumably be described in terms of semantic roles (deep cases). We use the FrameNet[2] project as a model, or rather a point of departure, in formulating frame descriptions that match our Arabic material. A matching English frame can sometimes be found with at least some frame elements corresponding to Arabic. For instance, the closest match to be found on FrameNet for QIṢĀṢ appears to be Revenge[3]. The purpose of our study is, however, different from that of FrameNet. The latter takes a holistic approach striving to capture all frames and every detail in the structure of a particular frame, and while FrameNet does show interest in the way frames relate to each other, it does so from the point of view of classification[4], while we are interested in how particular frames are functioning in a specific discourse. When traveling across discourses, concepts appear to demonstrate a high degree of variability, which FrameNet does not account for, while it does provide a lot of interesting material for a comparative study. Our points of interest include: (1) the way frames interact with each other in text and how such interaction contributes to creating new meanings and shaping distinctive features of a discourse; (2) how a particular concept varies across different types of discourses with some semantic elements of the frame coming to the fore and others being suppressed; and (3) the idiosyncratic elements in the concept's semantic structure and function, which point to differences between languages and cultures. Such difference in the purpose of study results in a different perspective on the frame structure. FrameNet differentiates between *core* and *non-core elements*. Core elements are mostly represented by tags that sound *lexical* (Avenger, Injured_party, Offender[5]), and while some of these may be reformulated in more generic semantic role terms as Agent, Patient, Experiencer etc., it is not always easy or even does not always make sense to do so. By contrast, tags used for non-core elements on FrameNet often appear to be generic and applicable to a wide range of frames (e. g. Degree, Depictive, Duration, Instrument etc.). Following this logic, one might assume that the none-core elements described in generic grammatical terms would constitute a less idiosyncratic part of the concept, but at least in instances that we have studies so far this is clearly not the case. The case in point is the quality of *speediness/*

promptness attached to QIṢĀṢ, which in the FrameNet language would be described under the rubric of non-cores (Descriptive, Manner or Duration). In fact it has as much right to claim a specific tag, as it appears to be almost as essential an attribute of QIṢĀṢ as its core elements – adjectives referring to other degrees of velocity or duration (e. g. *muta'aḫḫar* – belated) feature in collocation with *qiṣaṣ* in exceptionally narrow and rare contexts and even without any explicit attributive, QIṢĀṢ is conceived of as essentially a *speedy* action[6]. In other words, if we call the Experiencer of Revenge Offender, Speediness has almost as much rights to be called just Speediness as opposed to being subsumed under Manner. Our previous studies have also demonstrated[7] that in discourse, at least in some instances, more than one frame may simultaneously be applied to make sense of a single situation. The manner, in which they combine, thus creating additional aspects of meaning, is not accidental and has much to do with the semantic structure of both frames. The requirement of *coherence* between two frames used to describe a single segment of reality that has been formulated by Lakoff and Johnson in the framework of their conceptual metaphor theory may perhaps be extended beyond cases that they called *mixed metaphors*[8]. Idiosyncratic elements of the frame raise the issue of the relationship between language and culture. Zebra normally will have one strongly privileged color depictive *striped*, featuring as the animal's essential or definitive characteristic just as much as *speediness* is a norm for QIṢĀṢ in Arabic. While the Zebra case is defined by human experience outside of language, what about the *speediness* of QIṢĀṢ? It appears to be also defined by a reality outside of language, a social as opposed to the natural one, even more specifically, by a particular ethnic culture[9]. This social reality is (re)constructed through language and manifested in extra-linguistic semiotic systems such as behavioral codes. Events of the revolution are partly shaped by the language of revolution. Material facts on the ground created by its protagonists are also semiotic acts and, therefore, find ways back into the verbal discourses sustained by various often competing participants. The understanding of how concepts function in the verbal part of this complicated communication, or how the entire Egyptian revolutionary discourse evolves may not be reached if any part of this multipartite communication is discounted.

2. Within and beyond the frame

RETALIATION is not conceived of as an independent act that happens in and out of itself but comes as a response to another act. Semantic structure of QIṢĀṢ, therefore, presupposes another event with overlapping set of actors, which we will refer to as Trigger. In the Islamic normative discourse on QIṢĀṢ the Trigger is narrowly defined as KILLING (QATL) or PHYSICAL INJURY (JURḤ)[10]. Likewise, in the discourse of the recent Egyptian revolution QIṢĀṢ mostly come up as a subject of demands in the aftermath of (mass) killings of activists by the authorities. In other lay discourses, however, the concept may often be applied to a wider range of Trigger events including those that fall far short of criminal offense, however broadly defined[11]. An authoritative modern dictionary provides a definition for the noun *qiṣāṣ*, which seems to have been deliberately designed to fit both the narrow Islamic and broader lay usages: *al-jazā' 'alā ḏanb, an yuf'ala bi-l-fā'il miṯla mā fa'ala* (payment for an offence/misdeed, to be done with the doer the way he did)[12]. The concept semantics in both types of discourses appears to be founded on the idea of *qualitative equivalence between* the Trigger (INJURY) and QIṢĀṢ, which is conceived of as a type of PUNISHMENT[13] for the Trigger act. In all contexts, QIṢĀṢ also functions as a strong *moral imperative*, i. e. if a certain situation is defined as fitting the parameters of Trigger (particularly if it's KILLING), there may be any amount of disagreement between the parties to an argument, but never the very necessity to perform QIṢĀṢ will be called into question[14]. The ideas of *qualitative equivalence* and *moral imperativeness* appear to be as definitive and as strongly associated with QIṢĀṢ as

the need for it to be completed *promptly* or in a *speedy* fashion, which we have discussed above. While the latter idea may be, conditionally, fitted into the frame-semantic scheme (e.g. filling a non-core element slot usually described as Manner), the former two appear to present some difficulty. Frames, at least on FrameNet, are represented as flat relational schemes conjoining finite sets of (core and non-core) elements, which ideas such as *qualitative equivalence* and *moral imperativeness* do not seem to fit into, as they appear to be located at a different level(s). It is also important to note that these ideas as well as the definition of Trigger[15] are context-dependent, some may be foregrounded, some downplayed to varying degrees, or even totally suppressed. The concept thus shows considerable variability across discourses and may be described as a fuzzy set of variants with varying degrees of family resemblance to a *prototype*, which is best represented by QIṢĀṢ of the Islamic normative discourse[16]. Below we shall review two extreme cases, which fit neither into the strict Islamic definition of QIṢĀṢ, nor into the scheme of the concept dominating the political discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring. They may be seen as cases pointing to the boundary of the set as described above, similar to the case of ostrich in Eleanor Rosch's classical example with Birds[17].

Example (1) is a popular song *al-Bādi' Aẓlam*[18] by a modern Arab singer Jannāt Mahīd, which speaks in the name of a female abandoned by her lover, who now after a long absence wishes to renew relationship. The song's lyrics represent the girl's account of her feelings, which appear to be quite similar to what we find in Islamic normative discussion on the rationale of QIṢĀṢ[19]. The girl complains of having suffered prolonged moral pains, and is now rejecting her former lover ostensibly to punish him by letting him taste his own medicine, she says to him *garrib ba'a dū' min af'ālak* (so, try a taste of your [own] deeds)[20], which sounds as a colloquial Egyptian Arabic rendering of the phrase that we find abundantly in Islamic normative discussion on QIṢĀṢ: *iḏāqatan li-l-jānī mā aḏāqahu al-mujnī 'alayhi* ([by] letting the offender taste what he let taste the injured party)[21]. The concept seems to be so deeply embedded in culture that it may even function as a leading theme of a text without being explicitly represented as a noun *qiṣāṣ* or any of its verbal derivatives. This example stands in sharp contrast to the political discourse material that we discuss in our previous publications[22] as it represents the Victim's perspective on QIṢĀṢ. Interestingly, from this perspective, in contrast to the notion of *speediness* usually associated with it[23], QIṢĀṢ may appear as a continuing process. The lyrical hero of the song is enjoying the moment of her revenge in every next utterance emphasizing the impossibility of reunion and effectively condemning the Offender to the same prolonged frustration that she had herself suffered before. Esthetic value of the song comes from its very capacity to capture the moment of what in Islamic normative terms is described *tašaffī* – the feeling of relief at the fulfilled revenge[24]. While the external perspective of *speedy* QIṢĀṢ stays in sharp contrast to European idea of revenge as *a dish best served cold*[25], the Victim's perspective proposed in the song appears to be quite in line with it or at least not in contradiction[26].

Example (2). There appear, to be cases when the idea of full *qualitative equivalence* between the Trigger and the Punishment may be suppressed, as is the case with the story of a stolen car flipping over on the thieves, which was presented as an instance of a *speedy* QIṢĀṢ in an Egyptian newspaper:

> intaqama al-qadr min 'āṭil wa zawjatihi bi-l-manūfiya fa-'uqba qiyāmihumā bi-s-saṭw al-musallaḥ 'alā sā'iq bi-markaz birkat as-sab' wa al-istīlā' 'alā sayyāratihi inqalabat bi-himā as-sayyāra allatī saraqāhā min ṣāḥibihā wa tamm naqluhumā ilā al-mustašfā[27]
> The fate has avenged an unemployed and his wife in Manufiya after they had performed an armed assault on a driver in the center of Birkat as-Sab' and have taken possession of his car, the car that they had stolen from its owner turned over on them and they were transported to the hospital[28].

How do we account for such an obvious variation between these two cases? The difference perhaps is in the *perspective*. It is the Victim's perspective (Example 1) that privileges the *qualitative equivalence* of Punishment and Offense above all else, because it is believed to be the best way to heal the moral wound, and no other party but the Victim is so immediately concerned with this. As for Example (2), for an external observer, unless he is a Muslim scholar, it doesn't really matter so much whether the Punishment *exactly* matches the nature of the Offence. Particularly, if such observer is so removed from the scene and emotionally unconcerned as a reporter, or a reader of a news item. The fact that the reporter called his article QIṢĀṢ is an *interpretation* and not a *description* of two consecutive events that have occurred without him being able to affect any influence on their course, while no one among the actual participants of the events (least of all the fictitious agent of the second event – the Fate), *interpreted* as Punishment, *intended* it to be a QIṢĀṢ. On the other hand, it is hard to assume that the reporter was unaware of what QIṢĀṢ means in a more strict sense of the term, including the treatment of the concept in the Islamic normative discourse. Attributing the event as QIṢĀṢ, the reporter was operating in a manner not unlike the one described by Lakoff and Johnson in their seminal book, quite consciously representing a situation of *crime* and *misfortune* as QIṢĀṢ (i. e. that of *offence* and a *just punishment*) the way any conflict, even a peaceful one, could be described in terms of *war* – i. e. projecting one set of meanings upon another one in order to achieve additional effects[29]. These effects include: emphasizing the *speedy* fashion, in which the Punishment has come to pass, that what happened was in fact a Punishment, not just a *misfortune*, that the author actually approves it as the term QIṢĀṢ is a positive one and to ascribe it to an event means to assign it positive evaluation. Finally, by using such a big word for petty criminals he even probably meant to add a bit of irony to his comment.

Yet, the authoritative Islamic discourse has set the KILLING firmly in the position of a prototype among the family of Trigger events and, by force of the idea of *qualitative equivalence*, the *death penalty* as the typical manifestation of QIṢĀṢ[30]. The idea that QIṢĀṢ is typically associated with death and capital punishment is so much part of common knowledge in the language community that speakers may even use it in the *given* part of the statement, Cf.:

> wa lafat ilā anna maḏbaḥat būr sa'īd lā yu'lam taḥdīdan ḥattā al-ān man bāšar al-qatl fīhā fa-mim-man yuqtaṣṣ minhu, mušaddidan 'alā anna al-qiṣāṣ lā budda wa an yufa-wwaḍ li-l-qaḍā' wa li-walī al-amr wa wifqa al-adilla *li-anna al-qiṣāṣ bihi izhāq rūḥ*[31] And he turned [attention] to the Port Said slaughter, [which] [it] is not known untill now who has initiated the killing there and who [should] be retaliated against, underscoring that QIṢĀṢ should be delegated to the judiciary and *walī al-amr* (Islamic generic name for the ruler. – *A. B.*) and according to the evidence because QIṢĀṢ *is related to* (lit. *in it*) *putting to death* (lit. *destroying soul*).

3. Underlying structure: frame elements

The concept of QIṢĀṢ may be represented explicitly by several nominations, including verbal and nominal derivatives of the root *q-ṣ-ṣ*, idiomatic expressions or implicitly – through common phrases referring to key ideas associated with the concept such as the ones we discussed above[32]. The verb *iqtaṣṣa* (retaliate) as the key verbal nomination provides a clue to the analysis of the basic frame structure underlying QIṢĀṢ – the set of semantic roles referring to actors, who may be involved in the situation described by the frame. Core elements of the frame include the Agent, who we propose to designate by a *lexical* tag Retaliator, in line with the FrameNet approach; the Retaliator performs Retaliation against the Offender as a consequence of an earlier action by the Offender, which typically involves bodily harm (Killing or Injury), which we shall tag as Injury; a party that sustained an Injury we shall designate as an Injured_party. Similar to the

Revenge frame on the FrameNet, Retaliator needs not be the same as the Injured_party. While the Revenge frame description on FrameNet includes a statement that 'the judgment that the Offender had inflicted an Injury is made without regard to the law'[33], for QIṢĀṢ we should formulate it differently: 'the fact that an Injury was caused by the Offender to the Injured_party is presupposed'. The frame is in fact constructed on the basis of a presupposed frame that could be tagged Violent Crime and inherits its core elements from it (Offender, Injured_party). It may even be described as an operation on this presupposed frame, which involves broadening the perspective on the situation referred to by the presupposed frame by including additional elements and modifying/reversing the relations between the core elements. While the Revenge as described on FrameNet appears to be an action performed by Avenger for the sake of his/her/their own satisfaction, QIṢĀṢ is conceptualized as an act of justice performed for the sake of a greater social benefit[34]. It is not surprising, therefore, that the set of core frame elements of QIṢĀṢ includes one more party, which we tag as Beneficiary. Typically, and this is the single option that exists in the Islamic normative discourse, the Beneficiary is represented by the Injured_party's next of kin or *walī ad-dam* (executor[35]), but in the lay discourses it may also be any concerned individual or collectivity. In the discourse of the Egyptian revolution it is either *ahālī aš-šuhadā'* (relatives of the martyrs in a very broad sense) or very often just *aš-ša'b* (the people, meaning the entire Egyptian nation), cf.:

> an-niyāba taṭlub min aḷḷāh an yaqtaṣṣa li-š-ša'b min muttahamī madīnat naṣr[36]
> The Prosecutor's office demands from Allah to retaliate for the people against the accused of Nast City.

Description of Revenge on FrameNet includes Punishment among its core elements, which may be illustrated by the following example: "The team took REVENGE *with a resounding victory*". "Resounding victory" here is Punishment[37]. QIṢĀṢ has a similar frame element, cf.:

> al-jayš yaqtaṣṣ li-ḏabḥ al-miṣriyīn fī lībiyā *bi-ḍarba jawwiyya* 'alā mu'askar dā'iš[38]
> The Army retaliates for the slaughter of the Egyptians in Libya *by an air strike* on an ISIS camp.

In the discourse of the Egyptian revolution, however, this frame element is often left unexpressed explicitly. The idea of *qualitative equivalence* between the Injury and Punishment embedded into the concept implies that, if one knows the nature of the offense, which constitutes the Trigger event for QIṢĀṢ, one knows the nature of retaliation. But in a specific context Punishment may even become a focus of discussion with QIṢĀṢ as its key theme. This context involves a change of *perspective* on the referent situation. In contrast to the verbal nominations, the noun *qiṣāṣ* allows entering an *observer's perspective* on a particular situation. Observer may not be *describing* the situation in terms of QIṢĀṢ, but *judging* on whether it will be possible to describe it this way. In the example below the concept was used to evaluate a situation for correspondence to the perceived norms of a proper retaliation resulting in a negative judgment:

> lam tamurr siwā sā'āt 'alā al-ḥukm ḥattā ḫarajat masīra fī al-qāhira wa talathā ba'd yawm wāḥid muẓāhara fī al-iskandariya tunaddid bi-tahāwun wa tuṭālib bi-qiṣāṣ 'ādil yušaddid 'uqūbat šurṭiyeyn qatalā muwāṭinan dūna ḏanb[39]
> [a few] hours had not passed since the verdict until a procession came out in Cairo and a demonstration followed it a day after in Alexandria denouncing complacency and demanding a just QIṢĀṢ [that would] strengthen punishment for the two policemen [who] killed an innocent (lit. without guilt) citizen.

A concerned observer (participants of the demonstration), having evaluated the situation by comparing it with what it believes to be a norm, found the Punishment to be not

strong enough for the situation to be described as a proper (just) QIṢĀṢ. As a normative concept QIṢĀṢ, hence, has a double function: it may be used in direct reference to a particular situation (i. e. describe it) and also as a standard of evaluation, providing a basis for judgment as to whether or not a perceived norm has being observed in a particular situation. It is mainly in the latter function that QIṢĀṢ appears in the discourse of the Egyptian revolution, and the presupposed judgment is invariably negative, providing the revolutionaries with what appears to be a strong argument in challenging the powers that be. It is worth mentioning here that the frequency of the noun *qiṣāṣ* in the Egyptian media discourse of the revolutionary period exceeds the verbal forms: the Google search has returned 116,000 results for the noun and 93,516 for various verbal forms combined at the time of writing.

The grammar of the verbal phrases deserves a special note. In a phrase, the verb *iqtaṣṣa* functions as follows: *al-qaḍā' iqtaṣṣa li$_1$-dimā' ibnī*[40] (the court has retaliated for the blood-pl. of my son); *wa ṭalab min aḷḷāh an yaqtaṣṣa li$_2$-š-ša'b musliman wa masīḥiyan min hā'ulā' al-mujrimīn*[41] (and he asked Allah to retaliate for the people [both] Muslims and Christians against those criminals). The preposition *li-* may serve multiple functions: in our examples *li$_1$* expresses the idea of *exchange* (similar to *for* in the English phrase *pay for it*) and *li$_2$* expresses Dative (similar *to* the English preposition *to* in the phrase *give it to him*). The ambiguity is often eliminated by inserting the word *dam* (blood sing.) or *dimā'* (blood pl.) after *li$_1$* which makes it clear that the noun after the preposition does not refer to a living person, it is not merely a grammatical device but semantic too – it reifies the Injured_party. The preposition *li$_1$* may also be used to enter the names of the Injury (as in the example on p. 94 above). The two prepositions *li$_1$* and *li$_2$* are used respectively to introduce Injured_party /Injury and Beneficiary. The preposition *min* (from) introduces Offender. The underlying scheme that the set of the three prepositions appears to reveal is that of a transfer/exchange – something is *taken from* one party (Offender) *in exchange* of a Theme (reified Injury/Injured_party) and *transferred to* Beneficiary. The initial part of the transaction is reflected in idiomatic expressions often used in lieu of the derivatives of *q-ṣ-ṣ*, such as *aḫḏ dam aḍ-ḍaḥāyā* (taking of the victims' blood) and *aḫḏ al-ḥaqq min* Offender (taking the right, i. e. a rightful property, from Offender), and, finally, the tautological *aḫḏ al-*QIṢĀṢ (taking of QIṢĀṢ). The idiom (1) points to BLOOD as a token that often stands for the Theme of transfer[42]. The Offender unlawfully takes the Blood of the Injured_party and the Retaliator returns it to the Beneficiary, who is its rightful owner, thus completing the circle and achieving Justice. The idiomatic expressions with the verb *aḫaḏ* (take) reflect the Beneficiary perspective on QIṢĀṢ.

The two key transformations of the predicate *iqtaṣṣ* foreground different core frame elements. The active form, which we have extensively illustrated above, foregrounds the Injured_party and the Beneficiary. The impersonal passive form, used mostly in Imperfect, foregrounds the Offender, cf.:

(a) wa allaḏī ya'tadī 'alā ġayrihi bi-ḍarb yuqtaṣṣ minhu bi-ḍarb[43]
and [the one] who assaults another one with beating is retaliated against (lit. *[it] is retaliated against him*) with beating
(b) irhābiyū dā'iš buġāt wa ḫawārij wa lā budd an yuqtaṣṣ minhum[44]
The terrorists of ISIS [are] oppressors and Kharijites and it is necessary to retaliate against them (lit. *for [it] to be retaliated against them*).

Pragmatically, the use of impersonal passive form is characteristic of prescriptive utterances and discourses such as the Islamic normative discourse. The use of Active and Passive voice forms for foregrounding different semantic roles is of course a standard device across languages, but there seem to be also other more subtle means used for that

purpose in our case. Two adjectives that most frequently appear in collocation with the noun *qiṣāṣ* – *‘ādil* (just) and *sarī‘* (speedy) appear to help profile two different elements of the concept – *qualitative equivalence* between Injury and Punishment in the former case and the foregrounding of the Beneficiary in the latter[45].

4. Portmanteau concepts

In discourse, the basic frame underlying QIṢĀṢ may interfere with frames underlying other concepts and create a complex semantic structure with the same scope of reference. Other frames that are often used as an extension to QIṢĀṢ in political discourse include TAḌḤIYA/FIDĀ’ (SACRIFICE, REDEMPTION) and ŠAHĀDA (MARTYRDOM). These frames contain elements, which may be co-referential with frame elements of QIṢĀṢ, as they describe a situation, involving a violent death, which is a prototypical Trigger event presupposed by the frame of QIṢĀṢ. Frames are blended through matching elements Martyr to Injured_party, Beneficiary (every Martyr also has some Next-of-kin) and Blood (as a Theme of *exchange* in the underlying structure of both frames[46]). The difference between the standard presupposed Trigger situation of QIṢĀṢ (KILLING/INJURY) and MARTYRDOM is that unlike Injured_party in QIṢĀṢ, Martyr does not endure his death passively but dies for a Cause and causes presuppose a Purpose, and if this Purpose has not yet being reached even after his death Martyr may still be assigned an active role, which is reflected in idioms such as *the blood of Martyrs calls for (…)*, *the souls of Martyrs won’t be at rest until (…)*, cf.: *ayna al-‘adāla al-ijtimā‘iya allatī nādat bihā ad-dimā’ aṭ-ṭāhira allatī sālat bi-l-mayādīn yā rayis*[47] (where is the social justice that the pure blood spilled in the squares called for, Mr. President?). The Cause that the Martyrs struggled for may blend with Retaliation itself as a common cause of the revolutionaries dead and alive alike, making the frames go cyclic, cf.: *al-maṣriūna yurīdūna an yaraw qiṣāṣan sarī‘an yurīḥ arwāḥ aš-šuhadā’*[48] (the Egyptians want to see a speedy QIṢĀṢ [which] would put at rest/appease the souls of martyrs). In contrast to the latter lay usage, the Islamic normative discourse appears to be more materialistic as it never assigns victims of violent crime any active role in QIṢĀṢ. The Islamic apology of QIṢĀṢ is based on the analysis of social and individual interests and psychological conditions of those living, not the *souls* of the dead. Compare a lay usage, which although featuring the term *šahīd* (martyr), remains faithful to the standard Islamic interpretation: *al-qiṣāṣ al-‘ājil ya‘nī ḥaqq ahālī aš-šuhadā’*[49] (the speedy QIṢĀṢ is a right of the family of the martyrs).

The blending (contamination) of TAḌḤIYA/FIDĀ’ and ŠAHĀDA with QIṢĀṢ, hence, foregrounds the Injured_party element of the frame and assigns it an active role. In the discourse of revolution QIṢĀṢ mostly occurs in such blended (contaminated) form with Injured_party most often represented as Šahīd/Šuhadā’ (Martyr/Martyrs)[50].

TAḌḤIYA/FIDĀ’ describes a situation where someone or his/her Next-of-kin (prototypically a Parent) is willingly sacrificing his/her life for a cause (one’s country, religious sanctities etc.), the situation may be described from either the perspective of a person who is giving up his/her life or a Parent. When such act happens, the Parent receives or feels a moral reward, cf.: *wa aš‘ar bi-‘tizāz šadīd li-annanī qaddamtu aḥad abnā’ī fidā’an li-l-muqaddasāt al-islāmiya*[51] (and I feel a strong pride for I have offered one of my sons as a redeem for the Islamic sanctities); *annahu … musta‘idd li-t-taḍḥiya bi-nafsihi wa abnā’ihi al-aḥada ‘ašara min ajl filasṭīn wa al-muqaddasāt al-islāmiya*[52] (he... [is] ready to sacrifice himself and his eleven sons… for Palestine and Islamic sanctities). While the notion of TAḌḤIYA may cover situations other than those when the agent of TAḌḤIYA dies, the latter appears to be the prototypical case, cf.:

wa qāl ad-duktūr sayf qazāmil ‘amīd kulliyat aš-šarī‘a inna at-taḍḥiya fī sabīl al-waṭan tatanawwa‘ min at-taḍḥiya bi-l-māl wa an-nafs wa al-waqt wa al-‘amal al-jādd ḥattā

tataḥaqqaq rifʿat al-waṭan fī kull al-mayādīn wa tataḥaqqaq at-taḍḥiya bi-aʿlā maʿānīhā
bi-d-difāʿ ʿan il-waṭan bi-n-nafs allatī ḥarram aḷḷāh qatlahā illā bi-l-ḥaqq[53]
And Dr. Sayf Qazamil, deen of the Faculty of Sharia, said that sacrifice in the way of
homeland differs from sacrifice with property (material values) and self (soul) and time
and serious work until the elevation of homeland is accomplished in all fields and sac-
rifice is accomplished in its highest meanings through the defense of homeland with
self (soul – i. e. by giving up one's life), the killing of which Allah has prohibited ex-
cept with right (i. e. for a righteous cause).

ŠAHĀDA (martyrdom) is a *status* that one receives, when one dies for a noble *cause*
(prototypically a religious one, the most general idiomatic expression for which is *fī
sabīli-llah* – 'on Allah's way'), cf. *fa-qad kāna yatamannā an yustašhad fī rubūʿ al-aqṣā
fa-nāla aš-šahāda min ajlihi*[54] (and he wished to be martyred/die as a martyr in the area
of al-Aqsa and obtained martyrdom for the sake of it). It is believed that the status is
given by God: *as'al aḷḷāh an yataqabbalahu šahīdan* ([parent's word] I ask Allah to re-
ceive him as a martyr), which is reflected in the Passive voice form *ustušhid*, which li-
terally means 'to be called as witness/martyr' with God as an implied agent in Standard
Arabic, while the active form *istašhad* means 'to call as witness'[55].

BLOOD is a metonymical lifeline, most important element *shared* by relatives – par-
ticularly the *fathers* and *sons*. Through BLOOD they may be presented as a *single social
persona*, cf.:

> inna istišhādahu ḫaffaf ʿannī hawl mā yaḥduṯ fī al-arāḍī al-muqaddasa, wa adʿū aḷḷāha
> an yajʿalahu fī maqām aš-šuhadā', fa-iḏā lam astaṭiʿ aḏ-ḏahāb li-l-mušāraka *fa-damī
> hunāk*, dam ibnī lan yaḏhab hadaran[56]
> His martyrdom has tempered for me the horror of what is happening in the holy lands
> and I call Allah to make him in the position of martyrs and if I would not be able to go
> to participate [in the fight for holy lands] then *my blood is there*, blood of my son will
> not be spilled in vain.

It is important that BLOOD in not spilled in vain (*hadaran*) – a belief which fea-
tures both in the context of discourses informed by (1) TAḌḤIYA/FIDĀ' (SACRIFICE,
REDEMPTION) and ŠAHĀDA (MARTYRDOM) and (2) QIṢĀṢ. It is a major concern
for the Next-of-kin and the community at large that Blood of a Šahīd (Martyr) or an in-
nocent Injured_party is not spilled in vain, which means two things: in the context of
group (1) frames – it has to be *redeemed* (i. e. a noble cause, for which the blood was
spilled, has to be completed). Meanwhile, in the context of QIṢĀṢ – Blood has to be
taken back again in order for it not to be considered *spilled in vain*. The notion of *spen-
ding in vain* comes from the realm of commerce, cf. the following common expression:
ḏahaba māluhu hadaran (his money was wasted); *hadar ad-darāhima* (squander the
money), which points to the metaphoric structure underlying the whole set of frames as
analyzed above. All actors in these frames are bound by a *transaction* based on common
moral economy principle, which requires that all losses should be compensated to the
benefit of all interested parties: ŠAHĀDA is given for NAFS, QIṢĀṢ is a compensation
for the loss of loved ones, (clear, forbidden) Blood of the Injured_party should be re-
turned to its family (*awliyā' ad-dam*) by way of taking the Blood of the Offender, which
is not forbidden (*maʿṣūm*) and, hence, may be spilled in vain, as murderer's Blood is con-
sidered wasteful (*mahdūr*), i. e. not calling for further retaliation.

The blending of QIṢĀṢ with TAḌḤIYA/FIDĀ' and ŠAHĀDA achieved due to the co-
herence of these concepts enriches greatly the meaning of the QIṢĀṢ-centered discourse,
and what is most important in the context of the revolutionary discourse, elevates QIṢĀṢ
to a theme of greater public significance – in Islamic normative discourse for all social
significance attributed to QIṢĀṢ it is still presented as a matter between three individual
entities – Retaliator, Beneficiary and the Injured_party.

5. Conclusions

There appears to be a hierarchy of semantic structures that constitute a concept: (1) frame elements that form the underlying structure of the concept, (2) associated ideas (such as the *qualitative equivalence* of Punishment and Injury or *an eye for an eye* principle, *speediness* of QIṢĀṢ). Parts of the concept may be expressed explicitly or implicitly, some may be foregrounded others downplayed, associated ideas, which in some contexts appear to be essential may be suppressed in others. Concept varies across discourses, but variants of the concept continue to maintain family resemblance with a prototype, which in the case of QIṢĀṢ is best represented in the Islamic normative discourse. In different discourses concepts function differently by adopting a certain persistent pattern, which is characterized by a specific choice of foregrounded elements, associated ideas that are profiled or suppressed etc. A key defining characteristic, even perhaps organizational principle guiding such choices is the perspective. Discourses and genres privilege a specific perspective, which influences other choices in respect to various aspects of the concept, including profiling some associated ideas and suppressing others, foregrounding or downplaying frame elements. Lyric song, for instance, privileges participant perspective, news report – disengaged observer's one, and the political discourse – that of engaged (empathic) observer. In discourse concepts may operate not alone, but in a stable combination with other concept(s), which have to be coherent with them, meaning that some of their frame elements (semantic roles) have to be coreferential with the leading concept's frame elements, associated and presupposed ideas should also overlap[57]. The projection of one frame upon another serves a cognitive function as it helps create additional effects, including pragmatic ones, expand and elaborate the meaning.

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[1] Cf. Charles J. Fillmore. Frames and the semantics of understanding // Quaderni di semantica. Vol. VI, no. 2, December 1985, pp. 222–254.

[2] FrameNet is a web-based corpus, which draws on Charles J. Fillmore's frame semantics; the corpus contains descriptions of the internal structure of semantic frames referring to various situations, actions, events, cf. https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/home

[3] *Retaliation*, which we use here as a working equivalent for *qiṣāṣ*, as well as *retribution*, which often occurs as a match for *qiṣāṣ* in English translations, are also registered as a lexical entries under Revenge frame on FrameNet.

[4] It may define one frame as *inheriting* from another, when the latter appears to be more generic one, or inherited whenever it is more specific, causative of or inchoative of another frame etc. For full list see bottom part of any specific frame on FrameNet at https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu

[5] We borrowed these terms from the FrameNet description of the Revenge frame as presented on the current version of the FrameNet.

[6] For details see: A. Bogomolov. If you want to be just you better be quick: perceptions of a just retaliation in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring // Skhidnyi Svit (The World of the Orient), № 1, 2015, pp. 53–64.

[7] Cf., particularly, Alexander Bogomolov. Constructing Political Other in the Discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring // Scripta Neophilologica Posnaniensia. Tom XIV, 2014, p. 29.

[8] Cf. George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 96.

[9] The fact that the belief that RETALIATION should be performed in a *speedy* fashion is not universally share by all human cultures is attested at least by a popular European idiom *revenge is a dish best served when it's cold*.

[10] Description of KILLING as provided on the FrameNet, although based on English language material, seems to be quite universal, and for the sake of saving space we assume it as

[11] For more details on the semantic variability of the concept in lay and Islamic normative discourse see: A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

[12] Al-Munjid fī al-Luġā wa al-Aʿlām. 33rd edition. Dār al-Mašriq. Bayrūt, 1992, p. 631.

[13] The Islamic normative discourse describes QIṢĀṢ as a type of *punishment* (ʿuqūba), cf. the following definition from the online Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence (al-Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhi-ya), located at www.al-islam.com: *al-ʿalāqa bayn al-ʿuqūba wa al-qiṣāṣ ʿumūm wa ḫuṣūṣ muṭlaq, fa-l-qiṣāṣ ḍarb min al-ʿuqūba* (the relationship between the punishment and QIṢĀṢ [is that of] general and absolute particular, for QIṢĀṢ [is] a type of punishment).

[14] Cf. A. Bogomolov. If you want to be just you better be quick: perceptions of a just retaliation in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring // Skhidnyi Svit (The World of the Orient), № 1, 2015, p. 56.

[15] - particularly given the fact that the definition of Trigger may be stretched far beyond the KILLING/INJURY frame as we shall see below.

[16] Meaning the Eleanor Rosch's definition of *prototype* as in Rosch Heider – 1973 – E. Rosch Heider. Natural Categories // Cognitive Psychology, № 4, 1973.

[17] The 1st of these examples may be perhaps described as a *hardly a case for QIṢĀṢ at all*, while the 2nd one as *almost not a case for* QIṢĀṢ.

[18] The title is interesting of its own accord and may be seen as yet another nomination representing the concept of QIṢĀṢ. It is part of an Arabic proverb, which comes in several versions, the fullest of them being *al-ḫayr bi-l-ḫayr wa al-bādiʾ akram wa aš-šarr bi-š-šarr wa al-bādiʾ aẓlam* (good for good and the one, who started is more generous/noble, and evil for evil and the one who started is the more unjust/wrongful). The proverb appears to be a popular interpretation of the Quranic/Biblical *lex talionis eye for an eye* formula, cf. particularly the following versions: *waḥda bi-waḥda wa al-bādiʾ aẓlam* (col. Arabic, one for one and the one who started is the more wrongful) and *hāḏihi bi-tilka wa al-bādiʾ aẓlam* (this for that and the one who started is the more wrongful). In vernacular usage, the phrase *wa al-bādiʾ aẓlam* is commonly used to lay blame on the party that suffers from any sort of trouble on the party itself in a manner similar to English idioms *that is your own fault*, or *you had it coming*, the phrase may also be used in a sense of warning, like *it will be your fault if...*, or *do it at your own peril*.

[19] The normative Islamic discourse commonly sees the *wisdom* (ḥikma – meaning *purpose* or rather God's *design*) of QIṢĀṢ in its capacity to *heal* moral pains of the victim and take off the metaphorical *heat* (cf. for instance the following description *at-tašaffī wa bard ḥarārat al-ġayẓ* – 'the healing and cooling of the heat of wrath' – in Ṣāliḥ bin Fawzān bin ʿAbdullah al-Fawzān. al-Mulaḫḫaṣ al-Fiqhī. Dār al-ʿĀṣima. ar-Riyāḍ. 1423 h., part 2, p. 476 – http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-11811/page-895). For more details on this point see A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

[20] See: http://goo.gl/a0KKOm for the full Arabic lyrics of the song along with an English translation.

[21] Cf. Ṣāliḥ bin Fawzān bin ʿAbdullah al-Fawzān. al-Mulaḫḫaṣ al-Fiqhī. Dār al-ʿĀṣima. ar-Riyāḍ. 1423 h., part 2, p. 476 – http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-11811/page-895

[22] Cf. A. Bogomolov. If you want to be just you better be quick: perceptions of a just retaliation in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring // Skhidnyi Svit (The World of the Orient), № 1, 2015, pp. 53–64; Bread, Dignity, Justice and… Retaliation: the concept of QIṢĀṢ and the values of the Egyptian revolution // Skhdoznavstvo, № 67, 2014, pp. 20–38; A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

[23] Cf. A. Bogomolov. If you want to be just you better be quick: perceptions of a just retaliation in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring // Skhidnyi Svit (The World of the Orient), № 1, 2015, pp. 53–64.

²⁴ A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

²⁵ The saying is often described as an English proverb, while its origins traced to French literary sources, whatever the origin it appears to have stricken a cord with all European cultures.

²⁶ The difference between the two views of Revenge – the European and the Arab one – could perhaps be explained by this very difference in perspective – the European cultures tend to see Revenge as a private matter, hence, the tendency, even when discussing it in the 3ʳᵈ person, to assume a Victim's viewpoint, while for the Arab culture it is primarily a social matter; once the concept enters the context of the one type of discourse in Arabic that strongly privileges the individual perspective – the popular lyric song – the cross-cultural difference becomes neutralized.

²⁷ This brief news item was published by al-Ahrām under the heading *al-QIṢĀṢ as-sarīʿ* (speedy QIṢĀṢ) – http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Accidents.aspx?Serial=1090626. For more detailed discussion cf. A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

²⁸ The news article then goes on to describe the police interference in the case.

²⁹ George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. London: The University of Chicago press, 2003.

³⁰ The term *prototype* is used in the Eleonore Rosch sense (E. Eosch. Principles of categorization, In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978); texts referring to violent crimes other than killing (*dūna al-qatl* in Sharia terminology) and appropriate types of retaliation are limited mainly to the Islamic legal discussion and sporadic quotations of such discourse in the lay texts.

³¹ http://www.albawabhnews.com/8513

³² Cf. particularly Example (1) in Section 2 above.

³³ This is in fact a sort of meta-statement that may be compared to ideas of *qualitative equivalence*, *speediness/promptness*, *moral imperativeness*, which we discussed above.

³⁴ For the discussion of the public benefits of QIṢĀṢ in the Islamic normative discourse and what remains of it in lay discourses see: A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

³⁵ I. e. next of kin entitled (*mustḥaqq*) to the blood of the Offender in retaliation – Islamic law has specific provisions as regards who this person may and may not be.

³⁶ An article title, published on al-Miṣriyūn website (almesryoon.com) on 26 March, 2014; the 'accused of Nast City' refer to 26 members of an alleged terrorist cell based in the Nasr City – http://goo.gl/chndfh

³⁷ We have borrowed this example from the description of Revenge on FrameNet – https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/index.php?q=frameIndex

³⁸ http://www.vetogate.com/1480809

³⁹ http://m.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/121627

⁴⁰ http://www.masress.com/elwatan/509845

⁴¹ http://goo.gl/chndfh

⁴² For more on BLOOD as a metonymical substitution for the concepts of LIFE and KINSHIP see: A. Bogomolov. The Concept of QIṢĀṢ (RETALIATION) in the Islamic and Lay Political Discourses in the Context of the Egyptian Arab Spring // The Oriental Studies, 2014, № 68, pp. 3–20.

⁴³ Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān ʿAlī bnu ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Mūsā. Yā ahl amānī wa al-ġurūr istaʿiddū li-yawm al-baʿṯ wa an-nušūr. Dār ibn Huzayma. p. 23 – http://www.kalemtayeb.com/index.php/kalem/safahat/item/44537

⁴⁴ The name of mediaeval Islamic sect Kharijites is common Sunni parlance used as a negative evaluation term – http://alnabaa.net/Story/409451

⁴⁵ For illustrations see: Bread, Dignity, Justice and… Retaliation: the concept of QIṢĀṢ and the values of the Egyptian revolution // Skhdoznavstvo, № 67, 2014, pp. 20–38 and A. Bogomolov. If you want to be just you better be quick: perceptions of a just retaliation in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring // Skhidnyi Svit (The World of the Orient), № 1, 2015, pp. 53–64.

⁴⁶ Blood of Martys is spilled not in vain but for a Purpose in the Martyrdom frame.

⁴⁷ http://www.cairoportal.com/story/126174

[48] From an op-ed titled *a'zal yuḥārib al-irhāb* ([an] Unarmed Fighting the Terror) published on Rūz al-Yūsuf political weekly, 25 Nov. 2013 – http://goo.gl/9MtQk8

[49] http://www.cairoportal.com/story/126174

[50] In fact the use of the word *šahīd* in the context of QIṢĀṢ is a clear marker of political discourse; should a different term (e. g. *mujnī 'alayh* – 'victim, injured party) be used instead, the utterance containing QIṢĀṢ as its key term, will have to be attributed to a different type of discourse or genre (e. g. police report, news item on crime, Islamic legal discussion etc.).

[51] http://goo.gl/jUcDwJ

[52] Ibid.

[53] http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=1393705&eid=2754

[54] Ibid.

[55] It is normative for the Agent in this phrase to be never mentioned explicitly – i. e. phrase *ustušhida min (*qibal*) *aḷḷāh* (was called as martyr by Allah) would sound incorrect; spoken varieties of Arabic, however, use the active form in both senses (call as witness, become a martyr) reflecting a meaning shift – in vernacular *istašhad* simply means 'die as martyr, become a martyr'; in modern Arabic usage, including strictly secular, anyone who died for a cause, not necessarily religious one, would be called *šahīd*, which in translation functions as a better match for the English word *hero* than *baṭl* ('hero', according to most bilingual dictionaries), which is mainly used in reference to *living* heroes.

[56] An excerpt from an series of memoirs titled *qiṣaṣ at-taḍḥiya wa al-fidā'* (Stories of Sacrifice and Redemption) on Ṭarīq al-Islām web site (islamway.net) – http://goo.gl/jUcDwJ

[57] For instance, *violent death* of a key protagonist is part of the presupposition for QIṢĀṢ and an essential element of ŠAHĀDA/MARTYRDOM frame.