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VIETNAM AND KOREA TRADE RELATIONS DURING THE FIRST HAFT OF 20TH CENTURY

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During the colonial period, Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina of Vietnam were an integral part of the French Indochina. Meanwhile, after having pacified the Korean people's resistance, Japan gradually established her colonial administration in Korean peninsula. Korea and Vietnam trade relations therefore depended much on the economic policies of the metropolitan and colonial governments.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the trade relation between colonial Korea and French Indochina was a one-way street. Japan imported rice from Saigon and became a big rice importer of Indochina. In Korean markets, rice imported from Indochina was called Annam rice. Together with the process of political and military repression, a control system to monopolize the domestic and foreign trade by the Japanese colonial government was established in Korea, in which agricultural products were an ultimate concern.

In early 1945, facing the promptly military changes in Europe, the Japanese staged a *coup d'état*, overthrowing the French in Indochina. To facilitate their war economy, the Japanese tightened their control of economy. The Indochinese foreign trade was monopolized by Japanese companies. Many basic foods, especially rice in Korea and Vietnam were plundered to serve the war. These economic policies caused serious aftermaths for the colonial people. It was one of the reasons that motivated the Vietnamese and Korean people in their struggles against the Japanese in August 1945.


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In doing research on trade relations between Vietnam and Korea, it can be seen that to a certain extent, the statistic about Vietnam is nearly the same as that of the whole Indochina. Therefore, basically the comments on foreign trade of Vietnam are viewed without difference and impact on overall concluding remarks. The problem is that, because data analysis of Korea has been conducted under the condition of being unable to exploit many direct sources. This article seeks to only address the relationship between Vietnam and Korea through the roles of Japan and Vietnam towards other Asian countries, which in many statistical reports were noted in the category "*autres pays d'Asie*". By doing so, it seeks necessary information relating to the trade relations between two countries at this time¹.

1. Vietnam and Korea trade before World War I

During the First Colonial Exploitation, the French capital investment just was 9 % in Indochina. According to Indochinese Statistical Service, between 1888 and 1918 there was 364 million Frs in their investment in Indochina [Robequin 1939, Tableau XI, 181]. Other statistics showed that between 1903 and 1918, the investment in Indochina was 238 million Frs [Aumiphin 1999, 44–45]. Some industrial sectors such as Vietnam's cement export in 1913 to Hong Kong made up 50 %, Japan: 26 %, China: 10 %, France: 9 % and the rest: 5 % [Brenier 1914, 186].

**The foreign trade balance of Indochina
in the periods 1899–1903 and 1909–1913**
(unit: million Piastres)²



Referring to the report of the Monitoring Council of the Agricultural and Trade Service on the prospects of trade between Japan and Indochina (based on the statistics of Japan in 1909) up to the year from 1907 to 1909 (according to the current exchange rate 1 JPY = 2.58 Frs): in 1907, Japanese exported to Indochina: 645,294 Frs, 1908: 942,840 Frs, 1909: 1,134,573 Frs; and imports from Indochina: 1907: 22,350,470 Frs, 1908: 21,889,192 Frs, 1909: 22,995,764 Frs³.

**Export and import of some merchandises
between Japan and Indochina 1907–1909⁴**

Commodities (Lines)		1909	1908	1907
Japan's export to Indochina ($\Sigma = 206.000$ JPY)				
1	Coal	22,287 tons	10,104 tons	750 tons
2	Ceramics-potteries	31,693 JPY	32,340 JPY	24,400 JPY
3	Square silk towel	6,163 pieces	22,997 pieces	15,499 pieces
Indochina's export to Japan				
1	Rice	73,488 tons	93,920 tons	10,7640 tons
2	Cotton	3,810 tons	6,071 tons	3,457 tons

Because these two countries controlled most of the import-export sectors of Indochina, the two-way trade between France and Indochina increased rapidly and accounted for the highest percentage. The foreign trade balance of Indochina (counted on the average of 5 years) in the period from 1899 to 1903 was 140 million *piastres*, from 1909 to 1913 was 197 million *piastres*. Imported goods were usually metal items, machinery and trains, railroad, textiles, flour, tobacco sugar, tea, coffee, spirits... increased 170 % imported from France and French colonies. In addition, Indochina also imported British mechanical goods, generators from Germany...

A report to French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon from French Consulate in Seoul dated on 15th July with regard to the increase of rice import from Myanmar to Korea and the situation of the Korean market showed clearly that [GGI 3579]:

“In the current conditions (Burma's rice export to Korea), if the import of rice from Indochina accorded the procedure of the Korean, it seemed to be more favorable than ever before, as I have said in the telegram N°37 above that it could not understand whether the Koreans Indochina's rice more or Burma's one more⁵.

Though excluding of the complete failure for years, the rice import to replace rice from our colony, the failure of French importers, traders in Seoul to whom I have tried to show the benefits that they may have to find a new effort, (but) decided definitively not to have any further consultations on the deals of rice. I recently conducted a survey

of the real value of the consumption of rice from Indochina in the view or exactly the interests, curiosity of the Koreans in order to know if the loss of their trust was really crucial as said by many people or not. Therefore, it was because of the smell of machine oil that the rice was contaminated, the failure said above must be: no one cared about the discounts on a half first and then three quarters; the trouble was enough to spread loudly at the ports of Peninsula that this bad odors⁶ (*mauvaise odeur*) was always inherent to rice imported from Indochina which people just knew as ‘*Saigon Rice*’; Korean just thought that bad smell was because of the way to operate the milling machine.

Thus, I had question individually for each person, including 3 great traders in Korea about rice in general in Seoul and I am glad to report that all of these three people unanimously declared that imported rice from Indochina itself has no unpleasant smell and dirty musty taste, but it was because of the milling process, and that the aforementioned business, these deficiencies is undoubtedly due to the poor conditions which should be the first reason to mention, or because it has contacted with oily and smelly material or was placed too near the engine room⁷.

The report came to conclude that in normal conditions Indochina rice exports “still take a favorable development in Korea on a large scale and gain more profit than Rangoon [Myanmar] rice” [GGI, 3579].

In addition, since 1877, Sai Gon port had exported to foreign countries without Japan on the list. It is most probable that prior to World War I, the economic relations between the two countries Japan and French trade is one-way street only. Japan imported of rice from Sai Gon (Cochinchina) and become a super large importer of Indochina.

The report also said that in fact, Indochina rice was less expensive than (*moins cher*) compared to Burma rice for direct importers. However, the rice import at that time caused reaction in Korea population. After asked for advice, 3 merchants above said that “Our Rice (Indochina) only won when it is assessed under the correct label, if people agree to use, depending on the situation, it will let them know that product is from Indochina, it can tell them about how such reactions are as free samples. In response to my suggestions, they enthusiastically agreed, they did not speak to me furthermore that they shall not offer which is better if their population will be happy to receive rice from Indochina after being declared honestly that it will open a direct relationship with the exporter of our colonies (Indochina) as their expectation. They announced to be willing to pay import cost each month through banks or in some way that make sure to pay on time” [GGI, 3579].

Three great merchants (*en gros*) that had the most prestige in Seoul were: Son Wan Monk (address: Nandaimon Nai, Seoul), Lim Ou-Sop (Nandaimon gwai Cha-am, Seoul) and Yeng Sok O (Seidaimon gwai Sokkyo, Seoul). In these 3 groups, the business firm of Son Wan Monk is said to be the largest by the Consulate, which supplied almost all of the rice in Seoul and every day earned 1,000 JPY for each deal. This trader had an important role in the rice trade with Indochina.

Finally, the report concluded that “Saigon’s rice” (*riz de Saigon*) absolutely could compete with Rangoon (Myanmar) rice on the Korean market, therein the starting price of Cochinchinese rice is a major competitive advantage towards Burmese rice. The report recommended the Indochina government to send the samples for 3 dealers above soon (each sample about ten kg). That the base can be placed firmly in the Korean market will lessen the burden on the Japanese market as well as the policies of the Japanese colony government in Seoul about the abolition of import rights for Korean rice⁸.

In another report by the French Consulate in Seoul sent Governor General of Indochina on paddy cultivation situation in Korea and Indochina rice exports which was also sent to Jonnard, French Minister of Foreign Affair, analysed clearly about the movement of Korean rice offered to stop exporting Indochinese rice and that the prospects for rice exports to Japan would be very difficult because of the situation of the Korean economy as the current tariff regime for imports from Indochina to Japan [GGI, 3447].

Accordingly, the report of the commercial attaché Pilla on the production and consumption of rice in Japan in 1911–1912 stated clearly that: “Up to now, the tax was still nearly 25 % of the imported product value. Rice from many places mainly Cochinchina, Myanmar and Thailand, except for Korea and Taiwan... Until 1911, the annual average was 20 million JPY... It should mention about the Taiwanese and Korean rice. Rice of colony circulated in the market was paid by maturity in order to replace the supply of rice in the main country (Japan). In addition, the abolition of tax law dated on 1st April 1912 about Korea’s rice export (this measure is inconsistent with commitments to Japan after the emergence of Korea, in order to maintain the tariff regulation being in force in this country, in a period of at least 6 years). France and Britain were under concern about the ban on rice exports to the Japanese market from their colony (Cochinchina, Burma), Japan always tended to and continued their ways and only insisted on mere requirement” [GGI, 3577].

For Korea, generally Japanese always adjusted policies to change the probation and to fully exploit the colonial economic potential. Finally, the report pointed out that: “In addition to the current domestic market, it should also embrace the Korean market. China embraced the Philippine market, like their premium quality which help them to find an attractive market in India of Britain, although it consumes a great amount of textile fiber as I said before” [GGI, 3577].

On the other hand, the export of Korea’s rice was also regulated. Accordingly, a report by the French Consulate in Seoul sent to the Governor General of Indochina, said: “As you can realize that the note above is (about paddy cultivation and export in Korea) incorrect about rights referred, but it maybe just the right to enter Japan but not the right to export of Korean. These right here that was abolished by the edict of the Consulate Officer (通判) dated 29th March 1912 and the edict did not also specified whether the intention of the trade unions and chambers of commerce mentioned above aimed at the abolition of the right to enter for all types of foreign rice or only applied to Korea’s rice” [GGI, 3447].

Thus, according to the report sent from Korea, the failure in the export of rice from Indochina (here is Sai Gon rice) derived from objective reasons of rice quality (according to Korea). However, it was not the reason why the trade was suspended, but maybe because of the real demand for rice in Korea and Japan. Accordingly, it appeared that the annual production of Japan was enough in the year, do “that stop importing our Indochina rice” [GGI, 3447] was only applied in that year if the government of Indochina made necessary efforts to improve trade relation with Korea in the coming years.



An advertising page in French on Indochinese rice:
THE RICE OF INDOCHINA
nourishing...savoury... economical...!

2. Vietnam and Korea trade during World War I

The French colonial policies to Indochina, as well as other colonies implemented thoroughly her colonial exploitations both human resources and havings for the political machine running well [Opinion 1914].

During World War I, the Indochinese industrial economy focused on serving the needs of war. The economic sector that caused strongly disturbances and the Vietnamese social structure in wartime became trade. During the time, trade balance tilted towards Indochina and Asian region, in which it focused on the emphasis on the Asia – Pacific. Trade sector, mostly foreign commerce strongly depended on colonial production. This economic sector was gradually escaped from the domination of the economic groups instead needs of the market.

In facing nationalist movement, some colonial countries came towards a strong interest in the Asia – Pacific, including Indochina which was considered a base, a “balcony” to protect French interests in the Far East. “The program of the second colonial exploitation” or “The second capital accumulation” was established in the context by the Governor General of Indochina Albert Sarraut (1911–1919) [Saraut 1923]⁹.

In “The bill colonial exploitation” presented by Albert Sarraut to the French National Assembly on 12 April 1921, the ultimate purpose was not just tropical agricultural products but also undergrounded natural resources. Nevertheless, in the difficult situation of international economy, it was not enough to control back to the colonial economy, by contrast it needed to support, the program of A. Sarraut thus came to fail and be overcame due to demands of the colonial market [Thúy 2007, 111, 113].

Values of export and import of Indochina from 1915 to 1918

Year	1915	1916	1917	1918
<i>Value (1 million piastres)</i>				
Export	128	112	91	118
Import	94	79	68	69
<i>Difference</i>	34	33	23	49

(ASI, 1913–1922)

In relationship with Japan, although they participated in *L'Entente Cordiale* allied with France, because of being too busy with the war, France refused the proposal to discuss the issue of Japanese tariffs. In fact, the Governor-General had assigned Sai Gon Chamber of Commerce to consider several Japanese goods, but proposals were not enforced. However, considering the trade statistics of Indochina, the export to Japan in 1918–1920 had been a phenomenal growth and this trend continued to increase in the late '20s.

Indochina's export to Japan in the years 1913–1928

(Unit: million Piastres)



In terms of the situation of rice in Japan in World War I, the quantity of food from 1913 to 1918 remained at about 54 million and a half *koku*¹⁰. Nevertheless, as demand for the war, the Japanese government paid attention to the improvement of food supply in the country and colonies such as Korea by rapid expansion of cultivation area. According to the report of the French Consulate in Seoul, those measures oriented to the long-term results (*un avenir lointain*). To meet urgent needs, Tokyo had to import food from major markets such as Indochina¹¹, Thailand, Burma and China. According to the French Consulate in Seoul, among those markets, there was always tough competition. To control the trade in rice, In April 1918, Japan built a checkpoint to curb speculation [GGI, 3441]...

In the first decade governing in the colony (1910–1919), this was seen as a “dark period” (*amheukgi*) for the Japanese colonial government. It is caused by the pressure of political and cultural life in Korea at that time [Eckert 1990, 260]. Along with the repression on politically and militarily a control system in order to monopolize the domestic, foreign trade was set in which agricultural resources was the primary concern of the colonial government.


3. Vietnam and Korea trade in the years 1919–1929

WWI had a strong impact and a profound transformation of the colonial economies. With a focus on target of super-profit revenue, colonial countries did not give any public exploitation ways. Regarding foreign trade, one of the post-war targets was to expand the intra-Asia market (Intra-Asian trade). The trade agreement was signed more frequently among East Asian countries. In this context, trade relations between Indochina and East Asian countries made significant improvements.

However, since 1919 “the rice crisis in Cochinchina” (the largest granary of Indochina) made France face many difficulties in export¹². It is caused by losses of season in Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam and so on, foreign traders rushed to buy rice that caused food prices soared. More seriously in late July 1919, it happened the famine in Cochinchina, Chinese merchants sought to buy a lot of rice as a speculation for making money... Under the circumstance, an indicator of export norm was executed for the whole South America in order to deal with the imbalance of supply and demand. Prior to September 1919, export production was at the lowest level. Food exports regained the growth and became especially popular in the early 1920s¹³.

Under the impact of the crisis, the French report from Japan confirmed “the export of rice to Japan is the first and foremost choice of the Japanese people”. In addition, “it should expect that our Indochina from 1913 needed to occupy the leading position in the export of rice to Japan, and we would take advantage of this situation (crisis 1919) to find predominant role in the rice market and to establish with Japan a trade flow which is profitable most” [GGI, 3441].

Japan’s import of merchandises from Indochina (1917–1928)
(Unit: 1,000 JPY)



Enucleation of the above mentioned chart

Products \ Years	Years								
	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Rice	14,438	13,780	12,275	5,901	13,469	43,743	19,330	25,159	11,563
Cotton-fibre	131	1,436	922	616	489	976	152	907	94
Minerals	45	182	–	–	322	520	101	325	469
Fossil coal	4,703	3,445	3,522	3,256	3,293	3,698	3,841	5,235	5,212

[Lực 1999, 55–65]

Along with the changes in the relationship between Japan and Indochina at the macro level, since World War I, Japanese increasingly pulled many regional countries including Korea to the method of Asian colonial exploitation and the system of colonial mercantilism. The basic objective was to fully exploit the resources. Although there was no detailed information about trade relations between Korea and Vietnam during this period but the reports by the French consulate in Seoul and Tokyo showed the increasingly deep dependence of Korea in Japanese market as well as the shortage of food in Japan [GGI, 3441].

In the field of production and manufacture (especially mining, timber industry), while in 1931 these industries only accounted for about 18 %, in 1939 that amount increased to 40 % in the structure of production. The number of employees involved in the industry in Korea had increased from 384,951 people to 1,321,713 people (up to 343 %). In 1934, 95 % of Korean exported goods were to Japan whereas 80 % of Korean import goods was from Japan [Eckert 1990, 273–274].

4. Vietnam and Korea trade between 1930s and 1945

In 1929, at the London Conference, Japan proposed French down 50 % tax of goods for import goods in Vietnam. The 1929 economic crisis caused the two countries to work towards resolving economic disputes. In 1932, the French and Japanese Trade Agreement on a temporary trade regulation between Indochina and Japan were signed¹⁴. This is a first direct trade agreement between Japan and Indochina [Morice 1933].

Nonetheless, political changes of two countries made the agreement unrealizable. The militarized process turned strongly Japanese economy into orbit of war. Japan tried to strengthen forces in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia (where there were materials for industry, defense) and it was regarded as a national policy at that time. The French government dominated by the war in Europe determined to turn the Indochinese economy into the military apparatus [Robequin 1939]¹⁵.

In general, in this period, the import or export between Vietnam and Japan accounted for only a modest proportion in comparison with other Southeast Asian countries¹⁶. Value rice from Indochina exported to Japan compared to that to other countries:

By value (JPY) of rice and paddy imported from Japan

Country	1927	1926	1925	1924
China	2,635,495	664,933	2,292,120	3,127,719
British India	20,366,623	15,795,191	48,624,432	33,260,467
Indochina	25,159,443	19,330,778	43,743,002	13,469,780
Thailand	20,486,951	12,385,115	22,442,418	16,743,509
USA	8,674,723	2,489,810	2,355,901	3,795,275
Other countries	1,583,315	28,263	1,041,309	469,547
In total	78,906,550	50,694,090	120,499,182	70,866,297

In terms of economic relations between Korea and Indochina, a report dated 20th October 1935 of the French Consulate in Seoul sent to French Ambassador in Tokyo about the situation of Korean rice pressed: “The cultivation declined to around 1,500,000 *koku*

in 1933, but from November 1934 until the end of July 1935, Korea exported about 300,000 *koku* additional food for Japan to address the needs of Japanese. *In this situation our Indochina rice is probably found in Korea and Manchuria an ideal consumer market. You will find in an annexure below a record of my request by La Plaisant Frères Maison in Seoul – it was estimated in August this year according to the calculated cost per koku of the average quality Sai Gon rice [BEI, 1935, 1]*¹⁷. While *La Maison Plaisant* is hesitant to debark goods of Indochina because the rights and interests are limited...¹⁸

Before 1940, Vietnam’s economy depended nearly 50–60 % of export – import in France but after France was occupied by German, the trade relationship become deadlocked. Moreover, in August 1940, Japan - Indochina Agreement was signed there in Japan requested Indochina for priority entitlement compared to the third countries. Therefore, the Japan-Indochina trade relations grew enormously. Japan became the biggest “partners” of Indochina at that time¹⁹.

Because of being isolated by the Alliance, Japan was eager to promote strong trade relationship with Indochina. After the occupation of Tonkin in September 1940, Japan immediately satisfied with the lowest tax of goods shipped to Indochina. At the beginning of 1941, Japan also signed agreement to increase the amount of rice exported to Japan. Until May, tariff barriers in Indochina were dismantled [Lực 2001, 76–77; Lực 2003, 72–76]. In early 1943, Japan had the right to use “special JPY” in the payment with Indochina²⁰. Economic policies left serious consequences in the next phase of Vietnam’s economy as well as other colonies.


Wholesale turn-over of Indochina in 1942, 1945

Year	1942	1945
<i>Value (1 million piastres)</i>		
Import	247	18
Export	146	17
<i>Difference</i>	<i>101</i>	<i>1</i>

(ASI 1942–1945)

Considering the trade statistics began in 1940, the proportion of trade between Vietnam and Japan was increasing and in many times, it was the highest one compared to other Southeast Asian countries⁷ (such as in 1942). Along with that growth is the structure of commercial products changed although the proportion of rice was still high²¹.

By % value of import and export between Japan and Indochina in 1945



On 9th March 1945, before the changes of the military situation, Japan overthrew the French administration and came to dominate Indochina. For the purposes of war,

occupation forces implemented coercive economic policies. Both Japanese and French militarism, two rivals in the fight, brought the colonies into the circle of war. France's frail condition in Indochina led Japan be able to quickly monopolize economy in Indochina, including trade with Korea. The rice in Korea and Vietnam was plundered to serve the war. That economic policy caused serious consequences for the peoples of the colonies. That brutal exploitative policy pushed ethnic conflict to the highest point and that was a strong motivation for peoples of Vietnam and Korea to fight for independence in August 1945.

* * *

In sum, although the Korea and Vietnam trade relations during the colonial period are recorded in very few documents and sometimes sparsely and indirectly, it provides insights into the external economic conditions of two countries given the materials as above. In fact, by looking at the colonial archives in Vietnam, it sketches a few lines about the trade relations during the first half of 20th century. It nevertheless shows how the colonial governments in Vietnam and Korea managed and exploited the foreign trade of the colonies and especially how the Japanese expanded their trade monopoly from Korea to Vietnam. The severe economic condition caused by the Japanese war economic policies was the key reason for the anti-Japanese movements in the two countries sharing similarities and dissimilarities at the end of the Second World War.

¹ The whole materials of this article are discovered at the National Archives Centre (NAC) (NAC, No. 1 in Hanoi). A good part of the rest is preserving at the Centre under the font GGI (Gouverneur général de l'Indochine) or "RST (Résidence supérieure du Tonkin) – foreigners' activities", or at the NAC, No. 2 in Ho Chi Minh City that I hope to do with those in extending the time of relationship (during and after 1945, this article is also a part of the project under the grant number AKS-2017-R04 (17R04)) but in narrowing the space (Sai Gon-Cochinchina, Hai Phong in the relationship with Incheon and so on). Knowledge concerning Korean and Vietnamese relations in history is plagued by a large gap in research. More importantly, Korean and Vietnamese economic relations in modern history remain really unstudied by both Korean and Vietnamese scholars. Youn Dae-yeong, Nguyen Van Kim and Nguyen Manh Dung are considered the contemporary pioneers when in 2013 and 2014 they published in Korean and Vietnamese the monograph *A History of Vietnamese and Korean Relations, 1862–1945*. In this article thanks to newly discovered documents at NAC, Nguyen Manh Dung seeks to fill part of that gap and redraw knowledge of the economic relations between Korea and Vietnam during the first half of the 20th century.

² From 1887, the French colonial government came to protect her trade by tax. French merchandises therefore were freely circulated and penetrated into Vietnam. Many French companies were established in late 19th century and gradually promoted their activities in the whole region [Robequin 1939, 342].

³ Statistics of France in 1907 and 1908 about the direct trade between Indochina and Japan, in 1907 Japan exported to Indochina the amount of goods with the value of 10,834,225 Fr, 1908: 15,881,711 Fr; imported from Indochina in 1907: 2,037,839 Fr, 1908: 2,716,432 Fr [GGI, 3562].

⁴ In this period, a report was sent to Japan in which "Please pay attention to my record (Brenier) about export to China and Japan that our big competitors in this kind of goods are Korea, India, Thailand, and then Taiwan quickly comes to raise her role. In terms of cottons, major suppliers in turn India, USA and China. From 2 and 3 years, Egyptian export gradually is coming true" [GGI, 3562; Robequin 1939, 342; IH 1999, 66].

⁵ According to the reports of business firms in Cochinchina, Cochinchinese rice seemed not as good-looking as Rangoon rice and Thai rice but its quality was better than others'. According to other reports, generally Cochinchinese rice should not be compared with Caroline rice of USA and Piemont rice of North Italia, but on the other hand, in terms of nutrition value, it is the same, or even better than the best rice of other countries [Martini 1931].

⁶ Musty odor?

⁷ “Importations croissantes du riz de Rangoon en Corée. Exportations croissantes du riz Coréen au Japon – Possibilité pour notre riz d’Indochine de concurrencer le riz de Rangoon” [GGI, 3579]. Researches on the situation of rice trade in CochinChina in 1877 found that: Saigon port exported 1,467,854 picul (88,658,381kg) of rice, worth of 2,295,343 piastres (Indochinese currency) to countries such as France, Europe, America, Indonesia (East Indies of Netherland), Philippines, China (come to Hong Kong to account for the highest proportion) [Quang & Thanh 2000, 33–42].

⁸ Additional part of the report said that: “On 18th July 1913, the press continued to report the busy activity of ports in Korea, which is the massive import of Japanese rice... Rice from Korea was only moved to Japan after obtaining certificate about rice origin from the Korea Customs”.

⁹ Japan’s threat created the French government to implement an open policy for Indochina. Albert Sarraut’s policy based on the “association rules and enforcement of protection mode honestly,” in which his program of the second colonial exploitation as well as his many other policies, generally Governor Sarraut was not recommended by French immigrants, and even criticized by the French land exploiters in Indochina [Marc & Coly 1946, 142; Anh 2008, 151–152].

¹⁰ In 1913: 50,250,000 koku (1 koku = 80 litres), in 1914: 57,006,000 koku, in 1915: 55,024,000 koku, in 1916: 58,442,000 koku, in 1917: 54,068,000 koku (this figure is suspected by the French consulate in Yokohama), in 1918: 55,783,440 koku (58,982,000 koku estimated in a report sent from the French consulate in Yokohama dated 5th October 1918, excluding rice from Korea and Taiwan. In fact the figure was 55,783,440 koku, not including Korea and Taiwan, the report sent on 20th November 1918) [GGI, 2021 and 3819].

¹¹ In balance of import from it seems that Indochina always leads first. Reports of France Consulate in Seoul confirmed that “rice export licensing of Indochina are top priorities for the Japan- l’autorisation d’exportation du riz d’Indochine en été une première satisfaction pour les Japonais” [GGI, 3441].

¹² Due to the year of bad harvest in CochinChina, bad quality of rice and so forth that made Governor General of Indochina much concerned. A number of meetings were convened for improving and ameliorating the quality of rice for regional competition, especially Thai one... Rice export through Saigon port in 1919 was 762,259 tons, in 1920: 1,020,399, and better in the years afterwards [Pouyanne 1912, 370–385].

¹³ CochinChinese rice export: in 1918: 1,447,000 tons, 1919: 413,000 tons, 1920: 1,038,000 tons, 1922: 1,200,000 tons, 1923: 1,145,000 tons, 1923: 1,447,000 tons [Quang & Thanh 2000, 33–42; AO, 15/1124].

¹⁴ “Arrangement commercial entre la France et le Japon, tendant à régler provisoirement le statut des échanges entre l’Indochine et le Japon”.

¹⁵ According to a document analysis, French and Vietnamese trade accounted for more than 50 %, instead of the pre-crisis economic relations between Vietnam and foreign countries accounting 70 %.

¹⁶ For example, in 1931, Japan exported to Indonesia the amount of goods worth 63,450,000 JPY, nearly 37 times more than that to Vietnam and imported from Indonesia: 46,080,000 JPY nearly 7.2 times more than that from Vietnam. In 1939, Japan exported Indonesia the amount of goods worth 137,802,000 JPY nearly 70 times more than that of Vietnam and imported from Indonesia the amount of goods worth 71,741,000 JPY nearly 2 times more than that of Vietnam. For two kind of rice and paddy exported to Japan (called as Sai Gon rice), still accounted for the bulk amount in 1924–1927 [RST, 039841].

¹⁷ On 26 January 1935 (rice unity: 100 kg):

– In Saigon market: Blanc No. 1 (25 % brisures), price: 3.62 piastres (White N^o1 – 25 % broken rice); Blanc No. 2 (Japon 40 % brisures), price: 3.49 piastres (White N^o2 – Japon 40 % broken rice); Blanc No. 2 (Java 50 % brisures), price: 3.39 piastres (White N^o2 – Java 50 % broken rice).

– Meanwhile, in Haiphong: White 1st quality (estimated around 5~5.2 piastres); White 2nd quality (estimated around 4.2~4.4 piastres).

– In Hong-kong: Saigon Long No. 1: 6.54 H.K dollars; Saigon round No. 1: 6.46 H.K dollars.

– In Marseille: Saigon No. 1: 44.8 francs.

¹⁸ M. J. P. Dubose secrétaire-interprète de 2^{ème} Gérant le Consulat de France à Séoul à Pilla, Ambassadeur de France à Tokyo [RST, 75110-01].

¹⁹ In this period, the United States, Britain, the Netherlands implemented the embargo, freezing of assets, banning import... with Japan.

²⁰ The currency was passed from Indochina Bank in 1941 and early in 1945. Consequently, inflation was a major factor in the important reason causing Vietnamese famine in 1945.

²¹ In 1940, Japan rice exported to nearly 80 % of total exports throughout Indochina. Besides, nearly 70 % of the export value of Japan to Vietnam as silk fibers. The JPY is used in Japan to pay between Indochina and unlikely to encounter any obstacles yet [GGI, 4217].

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Торгові відносини В'єтнаму та Кореї у першій половині ХХ століття

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У колоніальний період Тонкін, Аннам і Кохінхіна (В'єтнам) були невід'ємною частиною французького Індокитаю. Після того як Японії вдалося приглушити корейський народний опір, уряд імперії поступово створив свою колоніальну адміністрацію на Корейському півострові. Тому корейські та в'єтнамські торгові відносини багато в чому залежали від економічної політики метрополії та колоніальних урядів.

У перші десятиліття ХХ століття торгові зв'язки між колоніальною Кореєю та французьким Індокитаєм були односторонніми. Японія імпортувала рис із Сайгону і стала великим імпортером рису Індокитаю. На корейських ринках рис, імпортований з Індокитаю, називався рисом "аннам". Водночас із процесом політичних та військових репресій у Кореї була створена система контролю монополізації внутрішньої та зовнішньої торгівлі японським колоніальним урядом, у якій сільськогосподарська продукція була важливим напрямом.

На початку 1945 року, зіштовхнувшись із швидкими військовими змінами в Європі, японці влаштували державний переворот, поваливши французьку владу в Індокитаї, і посилили контроль над економікою: індокитайська зовнішня торгівля була монополізована японськими компаніями. Багато основних продуктів харчування, особливо рису в Кореї та В'єтнамі, було забрано на потреби війни. Ця економічна політика мала серйозні наслідки для населення колоній і стала однією з причин, яка мотивувала в'єтнамський та корейський народи в боротьбі з японцями в серпні 1945 року.

Ключові слова: В'єтнам, Корея, Японія, економіка, колонізація, ХХ століття, рис

Торговые отношения Вьетнама и Кореи в первой половине ХХ века

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В колониальный период Тонкин, Аннам и Кохинхина (Вьетнам) были неотъемлемой частью французского Индокитая. После того как Японии удалось приглушить корейское народное сопротивление, правительство империи постепенно создало свою колониальную администрацию на Корейском полуострове. Поэтому корейские и вьетнамские торговые отношения во многом зависели от экономической политики метрополии и колониальных правительств.

В первые десятилетия ХХ века торговые связи между колониальной Кореей и французским Индокитаем были односторонними. Япония импортировала рис из Сайгона и стала крупным импортером риса Индокитая. На корейских рынках рис, импортированный из Индокитая, назывался рисом "аннам". Совместно с процессом политических и военных репрессий в Корею была создана система контроля монополлизации внутренней и внешней торговли японским колониальным правительством, в которой сельскохозяйственная продукция была важным направлением.

В начале 1945 г., столкнувшись с динамичными военными изменениями в Европе, японцы устроили государственный переворот, свергнув французскую власть в Индокитае, и усилили контроль над его экономикой. Индокитайская внешняя торговля была монополизирована японскими компаниями. Многие основные продукты питания, особенно рис в Корею и Вьетнаме, шли на нужды войны. Эта экономическая политика имела серьезные последствия для населения колоний и стала одной из причин, которая мотивировала вьетнамский и корейский народы в борьбе с японцами в августе 1945 года.

Ключевые слова: Вьетнам, Корея, Япония, экономика, колонизация, ХХ век, рис

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